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Abstract—In this paper it is shown that no public announce-
ment scheme that can be modeled in Dynamic Epistemic Logic
(DEL) can solve the Russian Cards Problem (RCP) in one
announcement. Since DEL is a general model for any public
announcement scheme [11], [3], [6], [21], [12] we conclude that
there exist no single announcement solution to the RCP. The
proof demonstrates the utility of DEL in proving lower bounds
for communication protocols. It is also shown that a general
version of RCP has no two announcement solution when the
adversary has sufficiently large number of cards.
Key words: Russian cards problem, Dynamic Epistemic Logic,
Communication complexity, Lower bound.
I. INTRODUCTION
In the Russian cards problem (RCP), there are three players
and seven cards. The cards are randomly distributed among
the players such that two players get three cards each and the
third player gets one card. The problem is to find a sequence of
public announcements by which players with three cards each
are able to acquire complete information about all the cards,
without the third player knowing about any of their cards.
The solution to the problem will imply a method to commu-
nicate information among parties in a distributed computing
setting securely without using any encryption [15], [23], [20].
The analogy is that, the communicating agents and adversaries
are modeled as players and the information to be communi-
cated as the ownership of cards. It is generally believed that
the above game gives unconditional security [11], [15], [23],
[20].
Various solutions to the above problem can be found in the
literature [9], [10], [22]. They all require at least two public
announcements. Here we address the problem of formally
establishing that no public announcement scheme can solve the
problem in fewer announcements. The framework of Dynamic
Epistemic Logic (DEL) is used to establish the lower bound.
Similar bounds using other models for related problems can
be found in [1], [2], [8], [15], [16].
The following sections briefly discuss dynamic epistemic
logic, modeling of RCP in DEL and a proof for the lower
bound. Finally a generalization of the RCP is presented and it
is shown that two announcements are not sufficient to solve the
general case when the adversary has sufficiently large number
of cards.
II. RUSSIAN CARDS PROBLEM (RCP)
The problem was posed in 2000 [11] as the following:
From a pack of seven known cards two players each
draw three cards and the third player gets the remaining card.
How can the players with three cards openly(publicly) inform
each other about their cards, without the third player learning
from any of their cards who holds it?
Let us call the cards 0, 1, ..., 6. The players are Anne,
Bill and Cath. Anne and Bill have three cards each and
Cath has one. No secret communication is possible. Only
announcements are allowed. The announcements are assumed
to be truthful and public. Through a sequence of such an-
nouncements Anne and Bill have to learn the actual deal of
the cards. i.e., for each card from the above pack, Anne and
Bill should be able to say to whom that card belongs. Also
for any card from the pack other than the one Cath is holding,
she should not be able to say to whom that card belongs.
Various solutions to the above problem can be seen in
the literature [9], [10], [22]. All these solutions require two
announcements.
III. DYNAMIC EPISTEMIC LOGIC ( DEL)
In this paper we express the RCP in the framework of
Dynamic Epistemic Logic (DEL). This section briefly presents
the syntax and semantics of Dynamic Epistemic Logic. More
detailed discussion of the DEL, examples and its applications
can be found in [3], [5], [13], [17], [18].
Kripke models and action models are semantical structures
of dynamic epistemic logic. Given a set of agents (players)
and basic propositions a Kripke model consists of the set
of possible states and accessibility (or indistinguishability)
relation between the states for every agent. The knowledge
of the players about the state of the game in imperfect
information games1 can be modeled by viewing game states
as Kripke states and players as agents.
Action models model the actions of the players that will
alter the knowledge of the players. Given an initial Kripke
model modeling the knowledge of the players, the action
models can be sequentially executed in the Kripke model,
resulting in a new Kripke model that models the knowledge
of the players after the action .
1In imperfect information games, players do not have complete information
about other players’ moves.
Epistemic Language: Epistemic logic can be used to
model knowledge in games of imperfect information [4], [5],
[6], [7], [19].
Let N be a finite set of agents2 and P be a finite set
of propositional atoms. The Epistemic language LP,N is the
smallest closed set for which the following holds:
• p ∈ P ⇒ p ∈ LP,N
• φ, ψ ∈ LP,N ⇒ ¬φ, (φ ∧ ψ) ∈ LP,N
• φ ∈ LP,N and n ∈ N ⇒ Knφ ∈ LP,N
The sentence K1φ is read as: agent 1 knows φ .
(φ ∨ ψ), φ → ψ, and φ ↔ ψ and are abbreviations for
¬(¬φ ∧ ¬ψ),¬φ ∨ ψ, and (φ ∧ ψ) ∨ (¬φ ∧ ¬ψ) respectively.
The notation ⊤ stands for ¬(p ∧ ¬p) for some p ∈ P .
Let a finite set of agents N and a finite set of propositional
atoms P be given. A Kripke model [24], [5], [4], [13] is a
tuple (W,R, V ) where:
• The set W is nonempty set of states {w1, . . . w|W |}
• The accessibility function R : N → 2W×W assigns for
each agent n ∈ N a set of ordered pairs of states. ∀n ∈
N , R(n) ⊆W ×W is an equivalence relation.
• The valuation function V : W → 2P assign to each state
a set of propositional atoms. ∀w ∈W , V (w) ⊆ P .
(w,w′) ∈ R(n) is interpreted as state w′ is accessible (or
indistinguishable) from state w for the agent n. The set of
propositional atoms assigned to a state by V is the atoms
which hold in that state.
A Kripke world is a pair consisting of a Kripke model M =
(W,R, V ) and a state w ∈W and is denoted by (M,w).
Semantics of Epistemic Logic:: Let a Kripke model M =
(W,R, V ) and the epistemic language LP,N be given.
• M,w |= p⇔ p ∈ V (w)
• M,w |= ¬φ⇔M,w 6|= φ
• M,w |= φ ∧ φ⇔M,w |= φ and M,w |= ψ
• M,w |= Knφ ⇔ For all w′ such that (w,w′) ∈ R(n),
M,w′ |= φ
A Player x knows the fact φ in the state w only if φ holds
in all the states indistinguishable from w. Also if φ is true in
all the states indistinguishable from w for Player x, she can
infer φ.
The action models are used to update Kripke Models. An
action model consist of a set of actions, an accessibility
(indistinguishability) relation between the actions for every
agent, and a precondition function for each action.
Let a set of agents N and the epistemic language LP,N be
given. An Action model µ is a tuple (A,R∗,Π):
• The set A is the nonempty set of actions {a1, . . . , a|A|}
• The accessibility function R∗ : N → 2A×A is a function
which assigns to each agent a set of ordered pairs of
actions. ∀n ∈ N , R∗(n) ⊆ A × A is an equivalence
relation.
2Players are modeled as agents. Agents are assumed to be perfect logicians,
i.e. the agents know all the consequences of their knowledge.
• The precondition function Π : A → LP,N assigns to
every action a precondition. ∀a ∈ A, Π(a) ∈ LP,N
Execution: Action models are used to update Kripke
model. Thus an action model is an operator on a Kripke Model.
The execution of an action in a state results in a new state if
and only if the precondition of the action holds in that state.
Let a Kripke model M = (W,R, V ) and an action model
µ = (A,R∗,Π) be given. The execution of action model µ in
Kripke model M results in a Kripke model denoted by M⊗µ.
M ⊗ µ = (W ′, R′, V ′) such that:
• The set of worlds W ′ = {(w, a) ∈ W × A | M,w |=
Π(a)}
• For every Player n ∈ N , ((w, a), (w′, a′)) ∈ R′(n) iff
(w,w′) ∈ R(n) and (a, a′) ∈ R∗(n)
• The valuation function V ′ is such that V ′(w, a) = V (w).
States at any particular point carry a tag of all preceding
actions. The state (w, a) will exist in the final Kripke model
only if the precondition of the action a is satisfied by w in
the initial model. Two states (w, a) and (w′, a′) are indistin-
guishable for Player x in the new Kripke model if and only
if the states w and w′ were indistinguishable for the Player
x in the initial Kripke Model and the actions a and a′ were
indistinguishable in the action model µ.
The knowledge of the players about the state of the game at
the beginning of the game is modeled by a Kripke model. The
knowledge actions which occur during the game are modeled
by action models. The knowledge development is modeled
by sequential execution of the action model in the Kripke
model, resulting in a new up-to-date Kripke model modeling
the knowledge of the players after the knowledge actions.
IV. PROBLEM MODELING
Given the set of players and the basic propositions, the
Russian cards problem (RCP) can be modeled in Dynamic
Epistemic Logic (DEL). Let U = {0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6} be the
set of cards and N = {a, b, c} (representing Anne, Bill
and Cath) be the set of players. The basic propositions are
‘card 0 is with Anne,’ ‘card 3 is with Bill’ and so on. If ix
denotes ‘card i is with x’ then the set of basic propositions
P = {ix | x ∈ N, i ∈ U}.
Initially Player a and Player b have three cards each and
Player c has one card. The Kripke model for the initial game
state is given by M = 〈W,R, V 〉 where,
W = {(A,B,C)| |A| = |B| = 3, |C| = 1, A ∪B ∪ C = U}
R(a) = {((A,B,C), (A′, B′, C′)) | A = A′}
R(b) = {((A,B,C), (A′, B′, C′)) | B = B′}
R(c) = {((A,B,C), (A′, B′, C′)) | C = C′}
V
(
(A,B,C)
)
= {ia | i ∈ A} ∪ {ib | i ∈ B} ∪ {ic | i ∈ C}
In any state w = (A,B,C) the set of cards with Player
a is A, the set of cards with Player b is B and that with
Player c is C. R(x), x ∈ N contains the state pairs that are
indistinguishable for Player x. The definition of R(x) follows
from the fact that initially Player x knows only the cards she
is holding. Hence all the states in which her hand of cards is
the same will be indistinguishable for her.
For each A ⊆ U, |A| = 3, let TA = {(A′, B′, C′) : A′ = A,
|B′| = 3, |C′| = 1 and A′ ∪ B′ ∪ C′ = U}.Similarly for
each B ⊆ U, |B| = 3, let SB = {(A′, B′, C′) : B′ = B,
|A′| = 3, |C′| = 1 and A′ ∪ B′ ∪ C′ = U} and for each
C ⊆ U, |C| = 1, let QC = {(A′, B′, C′) : C′ = C, |A′| =
|B′| = 3 and A′ ∪B′ ∪ C′ = U}.
Hence we have:
R(a) =
⋃
A⊆U,|A|=3 TA × TA and A 6= A′ ⇒ TA ∩ TA′ = ∅
R(b) =
⋃
B⊆U,|b|=3 SB × SB and B 6= B′ ⇒ SB ∩ SB′ = ∅
R(c) =
⋃
C⊆U,|C|=1QC×QC and C 6= C′ ⇒ QC ∩QC′ = ∅
R(a) is a partition of W and TA will be called a component
of R(a). Here W =
⋃
A⊆U,|A|=3 TA and the union is disjoint.
R(a) has
(
7
3
)
= 35 components each having
(
4
3
) × (1
1
)
= 4
states. All four states in any component TA are indistinguish-
able for Player a by the definition of R(a).
Similarly R(b) is a partition of W and SB is called a
component of R(b). W =
⋃
B⊆U,|B|=3 SB and the union
is disjoint. R(b) has (7
3
)
= 35 components each having(
4
3
) × (1
1
)
= 4 states and all four states in any component
SB are indistinguishable for Player b.
R(c) is a partition of W and QC is called a component of
R(c). W =
⋃
C⊆U,|C|=1QC and the union is disjoint. R(c)
has
(
7
1
)
= 7 components each having
(
6
3
) × (3
3
)
= 20 states.
The twenty states in a component QC are indistinguishable
for Player c.
As an example for A = {0, 1, 2}, TA = {({0, 1, 2},
{3, 4, 5}, {6}), ({0, 1, 2}, {3, 4, 6}, {5}), ({0, 1, 2}{3, 5, 6},
{4}), ({0, 1, 2}, {4, 5, 6}, {3})}. Player a cannot distinguish
between these four states because in all the four states Player
a’s hand is {0, 1, 2}.
Without loss of generality let us assume that Player a
is having cards {0, 1, 2}, Player b is having {3, 4, 5} and
Player c is having {6} initially. We denote this state by w∗.
Thus w∗ = ({0, 1, 2}, {3, 4, 5}, {6}). Suppose that a single
announcement scheme solves the RCP. In the final model we
claim that there will be at least one component TA3 and SB of
the partitions generated by R(a) and R(b) respectively such
that TA = SB = {w∗}. This is because if one more state
was present in the component, the Players cannot distinguish
between those states. Also there will be at least one component
QC of the partition generated by R(c) such that w∗ ∈ QC and
|QC | > 1. Otherwise Player c will be able to find out the actual
state. we present the claim formally:
Lemma 1: Assume that RCP is solved in Kripke model
M = (W,R, V ) and for all A, B and C such that |A| = |B| =
3 and |C| = 1, TA, SB and QC are components of R(a), R(b)
and R(c) respectively. Then the following statements4 hold:
3Let the initial state be M = (W,R, V ) and the action model be µ =
(A,R∗, pi). The states in the final model M ⊗µ will be a subset of W ×A.
But for notational convenience, we ignore the action-tags in the states. Hence
the set of states in the final model is seen as a subset of W .
4These statements are necessary but not sufficient.
1) ∃A, ∃B such that TA = SB = {w∗}5
2) ∀C, w∗ ∈ QC ⇒ |QC | > 1.
Proof: Let w∗ ∈ TA. If possible let TA contain another
state — say w1 such that w∗ 6= w1. Let w∗ = (A,B∗, C∗)
and w1 = (A,B1, C1). B∗ 6= B1 and C∗ 6= C1, otherwise
w∗ = w1. Player a cannot distinguish whether Player b is
having B∗ or B1. Also she cannot distinguish whether Player
c is having C∗ or C1. This means the RCP is not yet solved
contradicting the hypothesis. Therefore TA = {w∗}. Similar
argument shows SB = {w∗}.
∀C, w∗ ∈ QC ⇒ |QC | > 1. If |QC | = 1, then c will
understand which state she is in.
There does not exist even a single card that belongs to Player
a in all the states of QC . If such a card exists, say 4, Player c
will understand that 4 is with Player a. (Recall the semantics
for Knφ is discussed in section III ). Similarly, there does
not exist even a single card that belongs to Player b in all the
states of QC .
The above claim is tuned to our requirement of solving
the RCP in one announcement. It is easily seen that the
claim holds in any final model reached by any sequence of
announcements.
V. LOWER BOUND FOR RCP
Theorem 1: There exist no single announcement solution to
the RCP.
Proof: For the sake of contradiction assume there exists
a single announcement solution to RCP. Without loss of
generality it can be assumed that Player a is making the
announcement. Let the action model for the announcement
be µ = (A,R∗,Π).
In section III we have seen that R(a) partitions W into
35 components. Each component will have 4 states . Suppose
w1, w2, w3 and w4 belong to one component — say TA. Let
w1 be the actual state. Since Player a will be deterministically
making the announcement, she will make the same announce-
ment, say a1 for all the elements in TA.
In section III we have seen that the states (w1, a1) and
(w2, a2) will be be indistinguishable for Player a if (w1, w2) ∈
R(a) and (a1, a2) ∈ R∗(a). So in the final model (w1, a1),
(w2, a1), (w3, a1) and (w4, a1) will belong to the same
component of R(a). This contradicts Claim 1. Hence there
cannot be a single announcement solution to the RCP.
VI. A GENERALIZATION
In this section we will consider a natural generalization of
the RCP in which Anne and Bill are holding k cards each and
Cath is holding l cards from a pack of 2k+ l cards. We denote
this version of the RCP as RCP(k; l). Hence the original RCP
discussed before is RCP(3; 1) in the new notation.
It can be easily seen that for any k ≥ 1 and l ≥ 1 there
does not exist a one announcement solution for RCP(k; l) as
the Theorem 1 and the proof extends to this case as well . We
5Actually it should be TA = SB = {(w∗, t)}, where t is the list of
actions that led to the final state, but for the ease of writing we have omitted
the action tag list t.
will now examine the impossibility of a two announcement
solution for RCP(k; l) using similar strategies.
The set of cards U = {1, 2, . . . , 2k+ l}. The initial Kripke
model M = 〈W,R, V 〉 where,
W = {(A,B,C)| |A| = |B| = k, |C| = l, A ∪B ∪C = U}
R(a) = {((A,B,C), (A′, B′, C′)) | A = A′}
R(b) = {((A,B,C), (A′, B′, C′)) | B = B′}
R(c) = {((A,B,C), (A′, B′, C′)) | C = C′}
V
(
(A,B,C)
)
= {ia | i ∈ A} ∪ {ib | i ∈ B} ∪ {ic | i ∈ C}
TA, SB and QC are also defined similarly as in Section IV.
It follows that R(a) and R(b) will have
(
2k+l
k
)
components
each with
(
k+l
k
)× (l
l
)
=
(
k+l
k
)
elements each.
Suppose Player a is making an announcement α for a set of
components Tα. Since Player c should not learn about a single
card other than his own hand, we get the following lemma.
Lemma 2: ⋃
TA∈Tα
A = U (1)
⋂
TA∈Tα
A = ∅ (2)
Proof: Assume that this was not the case. i.e.,⋃
TA∈Tα
A = Q , Q ⊂ U .
Player c can infer that the cards in U \Q are not with Player
a. Hence U \Q has to be ∅.
Similarly it can be seen that
⋂
TA∈Tα
A = ∅ since if⋂
TA∈Tα
A = Q , Q ⊆ U , Q 6= ∅ , then Player c can infer
that the set of cards Q is with Player a.
Before proving the impossibility of a two announcement
solution for RCP(k; l) we need to prove the following technical
lemma.
Lemma 3: For k ≥ 2, l ≥ 2k2
ln k
⌈2k + l
k
⌉ ×
(
k + l
k
)
>
(
2k + l
k
)
(3)
Proof: Enough to have
2k + l
k
×
(
k + l
k
)
>
(
2k + l
k
)
i.e.,
2k + l
k
× (k + l)!
k!× l! >
(2k + l)!
k!× (k + l)!
2k + l
k
k∏
i=1
(l + i) >
k∏
i=1
(l + k + i)
i.e.,2k + l
k
>
k∏
i=1
(
1 +
k
l+ i
)
.
Since (1 + x) ≤ ex
RHS ≤ ek
P
l+k
i=l+1
1
i .
Bounding the summation by integral we get,
RHS ≤ ek. ln( l+kl ) =
(
l + k
l
)k
.
Enough to have 2k + l
k
>
(
l + k
l
)k
.
Let l = 2k
2
lnk
.
Enough to have 2 +
2k
ln k
>
(
1 +
ln k
2k
)k
since (1 + x) ≤ ex we get
(
1 +
ln k
2k
)k
≤ e lnk2 =
√
k
∴ 2 +
2k
ln k
>
√
k.
We can see that the above equation holds for all k ≥ 2.
Now we will prove that for sufficiently large l, there exist
at least two states in
⋃
TA∈Tα
TA which are indistinguishable
for player b for any announcement α satisfying Lemma 2 .
Lemma 4: For k ≥ 2, l > 2k2
ln k
for any announcement α
satisfying Lemma 2 ∃s1, s2 ∈
⋃
TA∈Tα
TA such that s1 6= s2
and (s1, s2) ∈ R(b)
Proof: Assume that there do not exist two indistinguish-
able states for Player b in
⋃
TA∈Tα
TA. From Lemma 2 we
will get |Tα| ≥ ⌈ 2k+lk ⌉ since |A| = k and |U | = 2k + l
(as the 2k + l elements need to be distributed among sets
of size k). Now the number of different hands possible for
Player b should be at least ⌈ 2k+l
k
⌉ × (k+l
k
)
. But the different
number of combinations possible is
(
2k+l
k
)
. By Lemma 3
⌈ 2k+l
k
⌉ × (k+l
k
)
>
(
2k+l
k
)
for l ≥ 2k2
ln k
and k ≥ 2.
Now we will prove that there does not exist a two-
announcement solution for RCP(k; l) if k ≥ 2 and l ≥ 2k2
ln k
.
Theorem 2: For k ≥ 2, l ≥ 2k2
ln k
, there exists no two
announcement solution to the RCP(k; l).
Proof: The initial Kripke model M1 = 〈W1, R1, V1〉
as described above. Let Player a make the first announce-
ment α. The action model for the first announcement is
µ1 = 〈A1, R∗1,Π1〉. α ∈ A1. Let s1, s2 ∈ W1 be the two
states which are indistinguishable for Player b in
⋃
TA∈Tα
A.
(s1, s2) ∈ R1(b). Let the resulting Kripke model be M2 =
〈W2, R2, V2〉. The states (s1, α), (s2, α) ∈ W2 will be in-
distinguishable for player b since (s1, s2) ∈ R1(b) and
(α, α) ∈ R∗1(b). Thus ((s1, α), (s2, α)) ∈ R2(b). Hence
Player b will make the same announcement say β for both
these states. Let µ2 = 〈A2, R∗2,Π2〉 be the action model
for the second announcement with β ∈ A2. Let the result-
ing Kripke model be M3 = 〈W3, R3, V3〉. Now the states
(s1, α, β), (s2, α, β) ∈ W3 will still be indistinguishable for
Player b since ((s1, α), (s2, α)) ∈ R2(b) and (β, β) ∈ R∗2(b).
i.e., ((s1, α, β), (s2, α, β)) ∈ R3(b). Hence two announce-
ments are not sufficient to solve the RCP(k; l) if l ≥ 2k2
ln k
.
VII. CONCLUSION
We have analyzed the Russian Cards Problem and the gen-
eralization RCP(k; l) in the framework of Dynamic Epistemic
Logic. It is shown that there does not exist a single an-
nouncement solution for the Russian Cards Problem within the
framework of Dynamic Epistemic Logic. Since the framework
is considered sufficiently general [11], [3], [6], [21], [12] we
claim that there can be no one-announcement solution to RCP
in general and no two announcement solution to RCP(k; l) for
l ≥ 2k2
ln k
, k ≥ 2.
The problem of deriving upper and lower bounds for
RCP(k; l) in general in terms of k and l remains open for
further investigation.
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